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 INFORMAL CONTRACTS IN TRANSITION ECONOMIES
NONTECHNICAL SUMMARY
In a transition economy many of employeeemployers contracts are infor
mal rather than formal Even in cases when formal contracts concluded
external legal enforcement of a contract often appears to be imperfect and
costly Sometimes this brings to the employer the opportunity to de
ceive the employee paying him a lower salary than she had expected
exante Underdevelopment of the judiciary system and weak enforcement
of courts decisions make this problem more serious and at the same time
more dicult to resolve The current paper provides a positive model of
deception at labor markets
The current paper addresses the issue of deception in labor market in the
two di	erent frameworks First in section 
 we examine internal private
enforcement in labor market in the framework of informal contracts We
consider a market with two types of the employees ecient and inecient
The major tool that the ecient workers could use in order to force the
rms to behave honestly is the active strategy leaving a rm in case
of deception Even in absence of external enforcement rms might honor
informal agreements if the threat of a deceived worker to quit is credible
and suciently costly Firms dont like to lose ecient workers because
they might be replaced with inecient workers Employees are more
reluctant to quit however if there is substantial unemployment so this
disciplinary device is inoperative if the unemployment rate is high enough
The model developed in section  adds the possibility of Court enforce
ment to the implicit contract model developed in the rst part In this
model we assume the contracts to be formal and introduce a possibility
for an employee to appeal to the Court in case of deception However the
court procedure in costly for an employee and Court verication is imper
fect If the quality of the Court is high enough it operates successfully
in preventing deception of the employees When the court enforcement is
of low quality or high expense then it is never invoked in this case the
second model reduces to the rst one where employees have no legal
recourse against rms that breach informal contracts However the inter
mediate case when the imperfect Court procedure is used by the workers
but fails to prevent contract breach by the rms produce an extremely
inecient outcome and rises the question of consistency of legal procedure
that is solved in the paper
NONTECHNICAL SUMMARY 
Note that the two interrelated and important issues are left out of the
scope of this paper First we assume ecient employee to be incapable
to reduce the quality of his work and mimic inecient worker as a tool to
punish dishonest rm This assumption is natural for the plenty of cases
when the word eciency refers to the employees competence or quali
cation In such a case imitating incompetence occurs to be impossible
or at least involves signicant moral costs Second the bad reputation
probably acquired by dishonest rm is ignored in the model We assume
the impact of this mechanism to be insignicant for the case of wide mar
kets and small rms However the study of the impact of missed issues are
to be the subject for further research
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 INTRODUCTION
In Russia especially at small private enterprises it is quite common to
avoid making a formal labor contract or to x all the employees benets
expected under such a contract In this case a verbal agreement between
employee and employer may include payments that are much higher that
the ones xed in formal contract In this case an employee faces a wage
consisting of two parts socalled white wage the low one stated in the
ocial contract and the black wage that is much higher but promised
just orally
As an example in  the average ocial wage in private sector was
reported to be 
 rubles a month in comparison with  rubles in
the state sector see Goskomstat 
 p  however the independent
researchers reported the incomes in private sector to be  times higher
then in the state sector Chetvernina Lomonosova 

Note that the black schemes of payment are used in developed countries
as well but mostly for the categories of the employees with limited rights for
legal employment foreign students illegal immigrants etc By the con
trary in a transition economy this practice is rather widespread It might
be due to inherited imperfections of the labor market overburdening pay
roll taxes and overprotection of the workers once a formal contract has
been signed
Another issue that distinguishes transition economy is low enforceability
of legally signed labor contracts As an example one could consider the
practice of wage arrears persistent for years in Russian economy see Earle
Sabirianova 
Whereas the contract theory literature see MasCollel et al  Salanie
 etc is mainly concerned with the ability of the employer to make
the employee exhibit socially optimal level of e	orts thus eliminating
moral hazard in transition countries we observe labor contracts with
weakened enforcement technology that are not obligatory for an employer
The incentives for execution of a contract by a rm are in focus of the
current paper
Let us start the review of the literature from Kronmans  Contract
Law and the State of Nature Kronman opposes the modern western
 INTRODUCTION 
economy where agreements are governed by the contract law enforced by
the state to so called state of nature where no external enforcement
machine such as a state exists


There were two features that Hobbes  included into the notion of
state of nature vulnerability of possession and transaction insecurity
Though some aspects of property insecurity emerge in transition economy
in the context of the current research we should follow Kronman and
disengage this issue from our analysis
The problem of transaction insecurity is formulated by Kronman in the
following way in a state of nature any exchange which requires one party
to perform before the other exposes the party who performs rst to the
danger that after completing his side of the exchange he will be denied
whatever it was he bargained for in return
Note that Kronmans concept of state of nature is exactly applicable to
the case of transition economy when the transformation of enforcement
machine is slow and imperfect As a result at the micro level the economic
agents appear in the state of nature to each other The informal labor con
tracts described above introduce a good example Note that the issue of
deception arises just because the wages are traditionally paid to employees
after some task was performed
If we study the economic transactions implemented in a state of nature
ocial legal system in modern advanced countries provides a benchmark
against which the alternatives are measured Economic and legal scholars
have constructed numerous models where such an institution is designed
to maximize social welfare taking into account various constraints on
information and policy and individuals optimal responses Polinsky and
Shavell 
 have surveyed this research
However the economic activity does not stop as soon as the legal system is
excluded Kronman suggests a number of alternative tools for the parties
to protect their rights such as hostage collateral handstying and union
Another alternative to external enforcement mechanism that economic
theorists have studied is selfgovernance modeled as equilibria in repeated
interactions

Note that the ocial legal system is not the only candidate for the role of
external enforcer One alternative to the formal legal system considers economic
governance by private intermediator Olson	s 
 analysis of private gover
nance by protmaximizing bandit is well known The newest achievement in
this way is Dixit 

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It is widely recognized that in many economic transactions informalmeans
are employed to execute mutually benecial agreements As S Macaulay
 points out social pressure and reputation are perhaps more
widely used than formal contracts and ling suits In many cases people
behave honestly because honesty is rewarded andor defection is punished
in future transactions
Kandori 
 classify such informal enforcement mechanisms into two
categories One is personal enforcement in which cheating triggers
retaliation by the victim These mechanisms are e	ective if quick
and substantial relations are available  that is they work best in
frequent and longterm relationships The Folk Theorem in the repeated
game literature Rubinstein  and Fundenberg and Maskin 
provides a formal model of personal enforcement showing that any
mutually benecial outcome can be sustained as a subgameperfect equi
librium if the same set of agents frequently play the same stage game
ad innitum

 However many important transactions are infrequent in
nature Therefore the control of incentives in such an infrequent trade
is of vital importance to understand the organization of economic trans
actions This observation leads to the second category of informal
enforcement mechanisms community enforcement where agents change
their partners over time and dishonest behavior against one partner
causes sanctions by other members in the society A wide branch
of the literature based on Kandoris 
 model of multilateral
punishments devoted to the study of such mechanisms Tiroles
 paper on collective reputations is more advanced step in
this way
The papers discussed above as well as the current paper belong to
a classical paradigm assuming economic agents to be selfinterested
However another approach to the issue of informal commitment is given
by the reciprocity literature pioneered by Akerlof 
 There is
substantial evidence see for example Fehr and Gachter 
 Fehr
and Falk 

 etc that some proportion of people do behave in a
reciprocal not in pure selfinterested manner That is some people
are disposed to reply in benevolent manner to friendly behavior and
vise versa

Even in a niteperiod setting coordination on ecient outcome is possible
if there is some unsertainty about the type of counteragent 
i e if a kind of
reciprocal strategy is assumed to be played with positive probability see Kreps
at al 
 INFORMAL CONTRACTS 
 INFORMAL CONTRACTS
In this section we examine a model of labor market were the labor rela
tionships are determined by informal contract One should conceive an
informal contract as an oral promise of the parties to behave in desired
manner This contract is not written and since its implementation could
not be contested in the Court So keeping to the terms of a contract is
just a matter of good will
Within the model the informal contract could be combined with another
contract that is perfectly formal and binding but provides worse conditions
for an employee The formal description of the contracts will be given later
 Model description
Let us now consider the market structure There are two populations in
the market rms and employees The number of rms is n the number of
employees is m Any rm possesses one working place We assume that
the number of employees is greater then the number of working places
m  n The numbers m and n are supposed to be large enough
The unique production factor is labor but the production process is pos
sible only in a match of a rm and an employee
We assume the economy to exist for two periods
The objective function of a rm is the present value of its expected prots
E  Ef

g  Ef

g Here one period prot of a rm is calculated as

i
 x
i
w
i
 where x
i
is one period output of a rm w
i
is a wage paid to
an employee We assume discounting the discount factor of any rm is 
The objective function of an employee is the present value of expected
utilitiesEU  Efu

g

Efu

g Here u
j
 uw
j
 is the value of employees
utility function in period j 

is the discount factor of an employee
Firms and employees di	er in types
There are two types of employees ecient high productive and inecient
low productive The value produced by ecient employee during a period
is x
H
 the value produced by inecient employee in a period is x
L
 where
x
H
 x
L
 Thus the output of a rm is determined by the type of employee
and takes one of the two exogenous values The proportion of ecient
employees in the population is  We assume for the sake of simplicity
that the both types are present in the market     
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There are two types of rms in the market good and opportunistic Pro
portion of good rms is  proportion of opportunists is      
We assume good and opportunistic rms to be present in the market
      The di	erences of rm types will be described below The
proportions    assumed to be common knowledge
The wages of employees are determined by the set of contracts Any con
tract is concluded for one period The parameters of the contracts are
exogenous and equal for all rms and employees
In this section we focus on the case of informal contracts possibly com
bined with formal ones
Every match concludes two contracts of the following exogenous struc
ture Formal contract includes the payment w
L
for a period of work irre
spectively to the output It may be some legally stated minimal wage or
zero or something else This contract is fully enforceable and binding for
the rm


Informal contract is concluded with any employee in combination with the
formal one and includes the payment w
H
 w
L
if the output of a rm is
high x  x
H

This contract has no legal enforcement mechanism and its implementation
is determined by the type of the rm Good rms always fulll infor
mal contracts opportunists decide whether to fulll the contract through
objective function maximization
We assume x
H
 w
H
 x
L
 w
L
 thus even if a rm fullls both con
tracts matching with ecient employee is more protable then with ine
cient
Since there are two exogenous values of the wage in the model the utility
function of an employee could take one of the three values u
H
 uw
H

in case of high wage u
L
 uw
L
 in case of low wage u

 u in case of
unemployment We assume uw to be increasing thus u
H
 u
L
 u


Let us now describe the timing in the model
When game starts all the vacancies and all the employees are free
At the beginning of the rst period random matching occurs All the
vacancies become occupied by the workers The numbermn of employees
stays unemployed We assume uniform random matching that is equal
probabilities assigned to all the matches with no respect to types

No formal contract concluded is equivalent to w
L
 
 INFORMAL CONTRACTS 
In the rst period production takes place and the rms obtain revenues
Thus at the end of the period the type of an employee is observed by the
rm
At the end of the rst period the wages paid to employees At this moment
opportunistic rms have to decide whether to fulll the nonobligatory rst
period contracts whereas good rms implement informal agreement Thus
an ecient employee when received the wage also receives a signal of the
rm type This signal is to be used in future decision making
Now every match has to decide whether or not they would work together
for the second period The rm has an option to dismiss the employee
the employee has an option to leave rm If both parties prefer to work
together for the second period the match would survive
Thus at the beginning of the second period some of rms and employees
are already matched and the rest of agents should go to the market and
take part in a new matching
At the beginning of the second period new matching takes place We
assume the numbers m and n to be large enough that is we can ignore
the probability for the same pair to match again In the second period
production takes place and revenues are obtained Then at the end of the
second period the wages are paid
Let us now list the strategic variables of the players
First all the rms have to decide whether to dismiss an employee at the
end of the rst period given the observed output Second the employees
have to decide whether to leave the rms at the end of the rst period
given received wage The opportunists have to decide whether to pay high
or low wage to ecient employees in the rst and in the second period
The strategic behavior of the players is determined by payo	 maximization
and a	ected by the probabilities to meet a counteragent of specic type in
the second period
In subsection 

 we analyze optimal behavior of the players subsec
tion 
 summarizes the equilibrium structure subsection 
 introduces
comparative statics in the model 
 analyzes the eciency issues
 Model solution
Consider strategic variables of the players
 The opportunists have to decide whether to pay high or low wage to
ecient employees in the rst period
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 Firms have to decide whether to dismiss an employee at the end of the
rst period given the observed output
 Employees have to decide whether to leave the rms at the end of the
rst period given received wage
 The opportunists have to decide whether to pay high or low wage to
ecient employees in the second period
Two of this questions have simple answers
Proposition  Opportunists never fulll informal contracts in the
second period
In fact paying low wage to ecient employees increases momentary prot
and there are no further periods to care for
Proposition  A rm of any type dismisses employee at the end of the
rst period if and only if employee in inecient
Proof Since we assume x
H
 w
H
 x
L
 w
L
matching with ecient
employee is more protable for a rm then matching with inecient even
if the wage is high Since m  n there is some unemployment in the
market and because of the random nature of matching there are some
ecient employees who stay unemployed Thus if a rm observes the
current employee being inecient it is the best solution to dismiss this
employee and to obtain some positive probability to meet ecient one
for the second period Controversially there is some unemployment for
inecient workers since if a rm dismisses ecient employee it has some
chance to meet inecient one and to bear losses 
The two questions remaining are decision of employee to stay or to leave
given the wage paid and decision of opportunist to pay high or low wage
to ecient worker in the rst period Note that the decision of inecient
employee is irrelevant for he is dismissed by a rm anyway Thus we should
concentrate at ecient employees and opportunistic rms
Let us introduce the notation
The strategy of the ith opportunistic rm is determined by probability
p
i
to fulll contract terms in the rst period With the probability  p
i
rm deceives an ecient employee and pays low wage
The strategy of the jth ecient employee is a pair of probabilities q
j

 q
j
H
 q
j
L
 In case of high wage in the rst period jth employee stays
 INFORMAL CONTRACTS 
with the rm with probability q
j
H
 in case of low wage he stays with pro
bability q
j
L

Denote by p 

n
P
i
p
i
an average value of p
i
in the population of oppor
tunists Average values of the probabilities to stay within the population
of ecient employees are q  q
H
 q
L
 q
H


m
P
j
q
j
H
 q
L


m
P
j
q
j
L

 Employee
Let us consider the behavior of an ecient employee under the conditions
of the game Note that decisions are to be made by employees at the
end of the rst period thus only the second period component of payo	
function is a	ected by this decision
Let us x the number of an employee under consideration say we consider
the behavior of the jth employee
Suppose the wage received by the jth employee in the rst period was
high It means that the rm the employee is matched with is either good
or opportunistic One can calculate the probabilities of the both cases
rm is good with probability

 p
and opportunistic with probability
p
 p
 Thus the expected utility of the employee in the second period if
he stays with the rm is
U
H
S


 p
u
H

p
 p
u
L

If an employee leaves the rm the expected utility is
U
H
L
  	
j
e
j
u
H
 e
j
u
L
  	
j
u


where 	
j
is the probability for the jth employee to stay unemployed
in the secondperiod matching e
j
e
j
 are the probabilities for an
employer to be good opportunistic given some employer was met by the
jth employee


The strategy to leave is chosen conditional on high wage if and only if
U
H
L
 U
H
S


These probabilities are determined by the decisions to stay or to leave made
by other employees since the decision of the jth employee to leave is already
xed
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Now suppose that the wage received in the rst period was low It means
that the rm the employee is matched with opportunistic for sure In this
case the expected utility in the second period is
U
L
S
 u
L
if the employee stays with the rm
If the employee leaves the rm the expected utility level is the same as for
the case of high wage its value is U
L
L
 U
H
L
 The strategy to leave is
chosen in case of low wage if and only if U
L
L
 U
L
S

Lemma  Let q
j
H
e
j
 	
j
 q
j
L
e
j
 	
j
 are the probabilities for the
jth ecient employee to stay with the rm when he receives high low
wage Then the optimal values of these probabilities are
q
j
H
e
j
 	
j
 









  	
j
e
j


 p
 	
j
K


  	
j
e
j


 p
 	
j
K


q
j
h
  	
j
e
j


 p
 	
j
K



q
j
L
e
j
 	
j
 





  	
j
e
j
 	
j
K


  	
j
e
j
 	
j
K


q
j
l
  	
j
e
j
 	
j
K




where
K


u
L
 u

u
H
 u
L
 
	
j
is the probability for the jth employee to stay unemployed in the
secondperiod matching e
j
is the probability for an employer met in the
secondperiod matching to be good q
j
h
 q
j
l
are probabilities
Thus the optimal decision of the jth ecient employee is determined by
exogenous probabilities e
j
 	
j
 and by the choices made by opportunis
tic rms p The probabilities themselves are determined by the choices
of the rms and the other employees how many places in di	erent types
of rms would be free after the rst period of the game One should note
that the right hand sides in the equations  
 are independent of the
decision of the jth employee
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Hopefully and somewhat surprisingly the equilibrium choices of the
employees can be calculated directly with no respect to the optimal strate
gies of opportunistic rms Denote by r 
m n
m
the unemployment rate
in the market
Proposition  Let q
j
H
r q
j
L
r be the probability of ecient em
ployee to stay with rm when he receives high low wage in the equilibrium
and r is the unemployment rate Then
q
j
H
 
q
j
L
r 



 r  r

 r  r

q
j
l
 r  r



where r

is a threshold value of unemployment rate calculated by
r



 K


 
 
q
l
is a probability
Note It is easy to see that the threshold value r

  
Proof The proof of the statement is given in Appendix A
Let us now give the rough intuition of the result First staying with
rm who behaved honestly is reasonable decision for any given employee
since there are less chances to meet good employer at the second period
matching at least there are chances to stay unemployed Second when
leaving a rm who paid low wage in the rst period an employee has to
compare costs and benets of this action Costs are the chances to stay
unemployed benets are the chances to nd a good rm The number
of good employers in the second period matching is fully determined by
the decision of ecient employees never to leave good rms and does not
depend on other strategic choices of the players The terminal number
of unemployed is exogenous Thus the comparative costs and benets of
leaving strategy appear to be easily determined in the equilibrium Of
course the leaving dishonest rm strategy is more inviting on case of
low unemployment rates when the costs are relatively low
One can see that the optimal strategy for an employee is either one of two
pure strategies or their mix in the following analysis we omit for simplicity
the zeroprobability case r  r

when mixed strategy is preferred
 Active strategy Employee stays in the rm if the wage is high and
leaves the rm if the wage is low q
H
  q
L
 
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 Passive strategy Employee stays with the rm in any case q
H

 q
L
 
We should see later that the active strategy of employees could work as
personal enforcement device that is threat of active strategy could prevent
opportunist from deception Now we should note that this strategy is
applicable for relatively low unemployment rates only
 Firm
Now we should calculate the optimal strategy of opportunistic rm The
ith opportunistic rm has to determine the probability p
i
to pay high
wage to ecient employee in the rst period
The wage paid in the rst period has some inuence to the probability for
the rm to be left by an employee at the end of the rst period In this case
the rm has to hire a new employee at the market The probability
e
 to hire
ecient employee in the second period is to be taken into consideration
The probability
e
 is endogenous it is determined by the decisions of the
opportunists to pay high or low wages and by subsequent decisions of
ecient employees to stay or to leave Let us dene
e

i
to be the value of
e
 in the case if the ith rm decides to pay low wage to ecient employee
in the rst period and
e

i
to be the value of
e
 if the ith rm pays high
wages in the rst period
The ith rm has to compare the expected payo	s for the strategies to
fulll and not to fulll the nonobligatory contract terms We have

H
 x
H
w
H
  

q
H
x
H
w
L
 
  q
H

e

i
x
H
 w
L
  
e

i
x
L
 w
L




L
 x
H
w
L
  q
L
x
H
 w
L
 
   q
L

e

i
x
H
w
L
  
e

i
x
L
 w
L



Suppose the employees play their equilibrium strategies given by  Then
the payo	 functions of the opportunist may be simplied

H
 x
H
w
H
  x
H
w
L


L
 x
H
w
L
  

q
L
x
H
w
L
 
   q
L

e

i
x
H
w
L
  
e

i
x
L
 w
L


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The rm fullls the contract if and only if 
H
 
L
or equivalently if

e

i
x
H
 x
L
 q
L
  w
H
 w
L

We should state lemma that characterizes the behavior of the opportunist
Lemma  Let the employees play their equilibrium strategies The opti
mal strategy of the ith opportunistic rm could be determined as
p
i

e

i
 q 





 
e

i
 q
L
  K


 
e

i
 q
L
  K


p
i
 
e

i
 q
L
  K



where
K


w
H
w
L
x
H
 x
L
 
Let us omit for simplicity the case r  r

when employees play mixed
strategies Then we should rewrite  for the other two cases
 r  r

 Then in equilibrium employees play passive strategy q
L
 
Then  takes a form p
i

e

i
   for any
e

i
   Thus one can state
a proposition for equilibrium strategies of opportunists in this case
Proposition  Suppose the unemployment rate exceeds the threshold
value r

given by  Then in equilibrium opportunistic rms never fulll
the terms of informal contracts
One should see therefore that in absence of external enforcement passive
strategy of employees leave no incentives for opportunists to be honest

 Now consider the case r  r

 In this case employees are active they
stay with rms if and only if the wage in the rst period was high Formally
q
L
 
Proposition  Suppose r  r

 r

is given by  and employees play
their equilibrium strategies Then the optimal probability for ith oppor
tunistic rm to fulll informal contract terms is determined by the rule
p
i
p
i
 r 





 r  Rp
i

 r  Rp
i

p
i
 r  Rp
i


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Here p
i
is the market average probability for an opportunist to fulll
informal contract terms given the ith opportunist pays low wages in the
rst period Rp
i
 is the threshold value given by
Rp
i
  
  
K

 p
i

 
K

is calculated by  p
i
is a probability
Proof of the proposition is given in Appendix B
Note Unlike the threshold r

that distinguishes the strategic areas of
an employee and lies between  and  the function of Rp
i
 may take
values outside   interval If it happens some of the cases in  become
impossible
Note that Rp
i
 is increasing function if and only if it takes values lesser
than  in fact the both properties are equivalent to inequality K


  
Figure  illustrates the statement of the proposition for the case of increa
sing function Rp the probability p
i
for the ithe rm to be honest is zero
for low p
i
Rp  r that is if the other rms are likely to be dishonest
Fig  The rm	s optimal strategy
and it is one for high values of p
i
Rp  r when the other rms are
likely to be honest Thus we observe strategic complementarities in rms
behavior honest strategy chosen by a rm improves the incentives for the
other rms to be honest Note that if r  R then the ith rm always
choose honest strategy if r  R then the ith rm always deceive
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Now we see that active strategy of employees really can play a role of per
sonal enforcement tool for the case of low enough values of unemployment
rate Other parameters a	ecting the eciency of this tool will be analyzed
in section  now let us note that the discount factor of an employer play
the same role as in case of multiperiod prisoners dilemma that is low
values of discount factor weakens personal enforcement power
Let us consider the symmetric case that is suppose all the opportunistic
rms play the same mixed strategy


Suppose an inequality holds K

    Then the threshold Rp
i

is greater then one and therefore  ultimately leads to p
i
  That is
opportunistic rms are honest in the rst period as soon as employees are
active
Now let us consider the case K

  
Assuming the symmetry one can easily solve the equation 
Assume r  r

 Find the condition for the equality p
i
 p
i
to be satised
in  Consider three cases
a Let p
i
  Then from  we have p
i
  if and only if
r  r


where
r

 R  
  
K


 
b Let p
i
  Then from  we have p
i
  if and only if
r  r


where
r

 R  
  
K


 
One can easily see that r

 r

as soon as    and K

  
c Suppose p
i
   Then to obtain p
i
 p
i
 p the equality
r  
  
K

  p

The assumption of symmetry is rather technical and does not change the spirit
of the results
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has to be satised One can solve the equation and nd
pr 
  
K

  r



 

It can be stated that pr    if and only if r  r

 r


Thus it can be stated that given K

   we obtain three zones of
unemployment rate
If r  r

then in a symmetric equilibrium opportunists are honest given
active employees
If r

 r  r

then the strategic complementarities between rms produce
multiple equilibria given active employees all the opportunist may be
honest or all may deceive or the intermediate mixed strategy may be
used by the rms
If r  r

then all the opportunists deceive even if the employees are active
One should note that the intermediate equilibrium p  pr is unstable
see Fig 
 the intermediate equilibrium is represented by the point
A at the gure In fact as soon as the market is moved from this point
Fig  Instability of intermediate equilibrium
for example if the parameters determining Rp vary or if some miserable
fraction of the rms deviate

 the optimal choice of any rm is determined
by pure strategy For example if by some disturbance we obtain p  pr
then the optimal choice of any rm is p
i
  and switching to this strategy
by some rms would improve the incentives for switching for the others

Deviation here brings no loss for a rm since the rm is indierent between
the mixed strategies 
see 

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As it was mentioned in the case K

    the rms are honest
However to unify the results one should introduce r

and r

dened by
  for this case as well Then we have   r

 r

 and for any
r we have r  r

 As well as in the case K

    this inequality
involves honest behavior
Let us summarize
Proposition  Suppose r  r

and the employees play their equilibrium
strategies Suppose the symmetric behavior of the rms Then
if r  r

then the opportunists are honest Good equilibrium
if r

 r  r

then multiple equilibria exist
a Good equilibrium all the opportunists are honest in the rst period
b Intermediate equilibrium opportunists choose mixed strategy with p 
 pr given by 

c Bad equilibrium all the opportunists deceive the ecient employees in
the rst period
if r  r

then all the opportunists deceive in the rst period Bad equilib
rium
The intermediate equilibrium is instable
 Equilibria
Let us now summarize the results obtained and describe the equilibria in
the game
We shall concentrate at the case of symmetric equilibria that is the players
of given type choose the same mixed strategy
All the rms dismiss the employees in the end of the rst period if and
only if the employee is inecient
Ecient employees choose whether to stay with a rm for the second
period or not according to the wage received in the rst period In the
equilibrium they choose one of the two strategies
A Active strategy  to stay with a rm if the wage is high and to leave
rm if the wage is low
P Passive strategy  to stay with the rm in any case
The opportunistic rms always deceive the employees in the second period
In the rst period opportunists deceive the employees if the employees are
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passive if the employees are active the optimal behavior of the oppor
tunists is determined by the unemployment rate
The choice of ecient employees and the rst period choice of opportunistic
rms whether to pay high wage to ecient employees are determined by
the value of unemployment rate and by the parameters of the model There
are three threshold values of unemployment rate r

 r

and r

 determined
by   and 
Theorem  Consider symmetric equilibria in the game The equilib
rium strategies of the players are the following
 Opportunists never pay high wages in the second period

 All the rms dismiss inecient employees at the end of the rst period
and never dismiss ecient employees
 a For   r  minfr

 r

g employees are active opportunists fulll
contract terms in the rst period
b For any r such that minfr

 r

g  r  minfr

 r

g three equilibria of
dierent structure exist in the game
i Good equilibrium employees are active rms fulll contract terms in
the rst period
ii Bad equilibrium employees are active opportunistic rms pay low
wages in the rst period nevertheless
iii Intermediate equilibrium employees are active rms choose mixed stra
tegy with the probability to fulll contract terms in the rst period given
by 

c For minfr

 r

g  r  r

employees are active but the opportunists
fail to fulll contract terms in the rst period
d For r

 r   employees are passive and opportunists pay low wages
to them
The Fig  illustrate the typical equilibrium structure in the model
Here the unemployment rate is represented by the horizontal axis the
vertical axis is the probability of honest behavior of opportunists in the
rst period The range of the values of r is divided into Active and Pas
sive zones by the employees threshold r

 Within the Passive zone honest
behavior is impossible The Active zone is divided by the rms thresh
olds r

and r

 For the low values of r Honest zone r  r

 the rms
chose honest strategy for sure For high values Deception zone r  r


the rms are never honest In the Intermediate zone the two equilibria in
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pure strategies coexist and are supplemented by intermediate equilibrium
represented by the upward slopped line in the Figure
Fig  Equilibrium structure a typical example
However the interrelation of the thresholds may be di	erent
Note The intermediate equilibrium is instable see Proposition 
 Comparative statics
In this section we shall analyze the e	ects made to the equilibria by the
parameters of the model
There are four types of stable equilibria appearing in the game and the
key parameter is unemployment rate
For the value of unemployment rate high enough r  r

 the incentives
for ecient employees to punish dishonest rms are weak and employees
choose passive strategy We should use the term passive zone for these
values of unemployment rate Within the passive zone employees stay
with a rm in any case and opportunists pay low wages
For lower values of unemployment rate r  r

 ecient employees punish
the violators by leaving a rm in case of low wage We call this strategy
of employees active strategy and this zone of the values of r active zone
Within the active zone opportunists are punished for deviations Whether
this punishment prevent deception or not depend on the market parame
ters and may be anew characterized in terms of unemployment rate Two
 INFORMAL CONTRACTS IN TRANSITION ECONOMIES
threshold values r

 r

divide the values of unemployment rate into three
zones For low values r  r

 the threat of punishment occurs to be
high enough to prevent deception in the rst period We call this interval
honest zone For high values of unemployment rate r  r

 activity of
employees fails to prevent deception in the rst period deception zone
For the intermediate values of r the strategic complementarities for the
opportunists behavior produce multiple equilibria
One should be interested in dependence of threshold values r

 r

 r


from market parameters
First consider the value of r

 that determines the switch of employees
from active to passive strategy Note that active strategy of employees
could de treated as a kind of market enforcement mechanism for rms to
fulll the contracts when employees are passive opportunistic rms break
the contracts Active strategy is applicable if unemployment rate is low
enough r  r

 We should examine the dependence of active zone from
market parameters
From  one could see that r

increases with  and falls with  Thus
higher is the proportion of good rms at the market wider is the active
zone However the growth of proportion of competing ecient employees
narrows the active zone The rst relationship is straightforward In fact
more good rms are present in the market the more chances an employee
have to meet good rm in the second period thus activity appears to be
more attractive At the same time the rise of the number of ecient
employees reduces the chances to meet good rm in the second period In
fact good vacancy become free after the rst period if and only if it have
been occupied by inecient worker
Then r

is a	ected by utility gaps between di	erent states for an employee
One should compare the utility increase when moving from unemployment
to low wage and from low wage to high wage If the gap between high and
low wages is wide enough it provides greater incentives for active behavior
One could consider this statement in di	erent contexts First suppose the
monetary payo	s in di	erent states being xed Than the utility gaps ratio
of an employee is determined by his or her risk attitude More risk averse
is an employee less likely he or she would play the active strategy and leave
the rm Second the employees activity is dependent from unemployment
benets If some compensation for unemployment is available u

  it
rises the activity of employees
Now let us consider the parameters of opportunistic rms strategies
There are two threshold values of unemployment rate r

and r

 If unem
ployment is low r  r

 then rms fulll the informal contracts conditional
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to activity of the employees If unemployment is high r  r

then rms
break the contracts already in the rst period In the intermediate zone the
both cases are possible and the behavior of one rm is positively related
with the others What parameters determine the threshold values 
One can see from   that the both threshold values increase with
discount factor of rms  That is higher is valuation of future prots wider
is honest zone The results of this type are typical for personal enforcement
mechanisms such as trigger strategy in prisoners dilemma model These
mechanisms work in case of high enough discount factors that is if the
future prots are valuable
The threshold r

grows with the proportion of good rms Thus one
obtains strategic complementarities in rms behavior more honest rms
are at the market higher are the incentives for given rm to be honest
The dependence of r

and r

from the proportion of ecient employees
may formally have di	erent direction However r

or r

may rise with
 solely if the value of threshold is negative and thus has no inuence at
the equilibrium structure That is the rise of the proportion of ecient
employees contributes to deception The intuition is clear more ecient
employees are at the market less is the damage when ecient employee
leaves a rm
Then higher relative productivity of ecient employees in comparison
with inecient produce incentives for honesty and vice versa higher rela
tive wages for ecient work are less likely to be paid
If we summarize the results obtained from the employees and employers
side we could see that the rise in the proportion of good rms reduces the
deception whereas the rise in the proportion of ecient employees extends
the deception in the market
The rst of the two statements is intuitive more honest rms are present
in the market less is the power of an opportunist and less chances he has
to deceive without being punished
The second statement may be interpreted in the following way One should
consider the proportion of ecient employees at the market as a measure
of market sensitiveness to the skills or qualication of an employee If
the tasks of the employees are rather standard and easy there would be
just a few employees to be considered as inecient On the contrary if
the market requires an employee to be highly qualied the proportion
of inecient employees becomes substantial The model shows that at
more skilldemanding markets we should observe less deception In this
setting the statement becomes intuitive if an employee is highly ecient in
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comparison with the market average there are less chances to be deceived
just because of high value of his work for a rm
Let us now consider a numerical example
Basic Example Suppose the wage guaranteed by the formal contract is
w
L
 
 whereas the informal contract promises higher wage w
H
 
We suppose that the productivity of inecient employee is x
L
  and
the productivity of ecient one is x
H
 
 The utility function of an
employee is uw 
p
w The proportion of good rms is     the
rest of the rms are opportunists   
 The proportion of ecient
employees is    The discount factor of the rms is   
In this case one could calculate the threshold values
r

 
 r

  r

 
That is for unemployment rates lower then 
 the only equilibrium
in the model is good one employees are active and opportunistic rms
are honest in the rst period If the unemployment rate exceeds 

then employees become passive and opportunists never fulll the terms of
informal contracts
Suppose the discount factor  of the rms falls from  to  Than the
employees activity threshold stay unchanged whereas the opportunistic
rms become less likely to be honest in the rst period
r

 
 r

 
 r

 
Now for the unemployment rates less than 
 employees are still active
but the threat to lose a good worker is valuable enough only for unemploy
ment rates below 
 In the segment 
 to  the multiple equilibria
are possible and for r   the opportunists deceive employees for sure
Let us come back to the Basic Example and suppose that the proportion
of good rms fallen from  to  Than
r

 
 r

 
 r

 
We see that the active zone of the employees and honest zone of oppor
tunists narrowed Now opportunists are honest for sure just for r  

for 
  r  
 employees are still active and multiple equilibria are
possible That is the opportunists may or may be honest in this case For
higher unemployment rates employees become passive and there no reason
for opportunists to play honest strategy
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Suppose now that in the Basic Example the proportion of ecient employ
ees have grown from  to  Then
r

 
 r

 
 r

 
We see that all the three values have fallen Now good equilibria prevails
for r  
 then for 
  r  
 multiple equilibria exist And for
r  
 employees become passive and thus are deceived by opportunists
Suppose now in the Basic Example employees being risk neutral That
is change the utility function for uw  w Then the thresholds for the
rms stay unchanged whereas the activity zone of the employees grows
r

  r

  r

 
Now for r   employees are active and rms are honest for   r 
  multiple equilibria exist and only if r   opportunists would
for sure deceive ecient employees
Similar e	ect achieved by introducing some unemployment benet say if
in the Basic Example u

  then
r

  r

  r

 
 Deception and eciency
In this section we should analyze the e	ects made by the presence of
deception it the market on social welfare We should distinguish the two
issues of eciency in this case eciency in production and eciency in
distribution
First if the employees in the economy are riskaverse then the distribution
provided in case of deception may be found to be inecient
In fact the welfare of a match is calculated as
W    u  xw  uw
Note that the value x of the matchs output is exogenous and depends
exclusively on the type of an employee x  x
H
for ecient employees and
x  x
L
for inecient However as soon as we assume an employee being
riskaverse the eciency of output distribution depends on the values of
the wages paid If we suppose the high wage to be ecient u

w
H
  
or at least to be closer to the optimal level then the low wage is than we
observe distribution ineciency produced by the fact of deception in the
match
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If the employees are risk neutral namely if we assume the employees
utility function to be uw  w then the fact of deception is irrelevant
for social welfare in the period when deception occurs it a	ects the dis
tribution only However the practice of deception in the market could be
a source of suboptimal level of output in subsequent period
Suppose that employees in the economy as well as rms are riskneutral
uw  w Then the only eciency issue we have to consider is the pro
duction eciency since the value of wages paid to the employees does not
a	ect social welfare
The value produced in the economy depends of the number of ecient
employees employed In general we could calculate the social welfare func
tion as
SW  E fE

 x
H
 n E

  x
L
  E

 x
H
 n E

  x
L
g 
where E
k
is the number of ecient employees employed in period k
n  E
k
 is the number of inecient employees employed in period k
 is the discount factor
	

One could conclude that the Social Welfare rises with the number of e
cient employees employed in any period
The number of ecient employees employed in the rst period is deter
mined exogenously We have
EE

 n
as soon as  is the proportion of ecient employees at the market n is the
number of rms and the matching supposed to be uniformly random
The number of ecient employees employed in the second period is
endogenous and depends on the strategies chosen by the players Let
us calculate this number for the di	erent types of equilibria
 Active employees honest rms Good Equilibrium
In this case all the ecient employees employed in the rst period stay
with their rms while the working places occupied by inecient workers
in the rst period become vacant at the start of the second period The
probability to meet ecient employee in the second period is
e
 
m  n
m  n
see Appendix B That is the total number of ecient employees employed

Here we assume for simplicity that the discount factor of the employees 

equals the discount factor of the rms
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in the second period could be calculated as
EE
AH

 n   n
e
  n  n
m  n
m n
that is
EE
AH

 n
m  n m 
m  n
 

 Passive employees dishonest rms
As well as in the previous case the ecient employees employed in the rst
period stay with their rms while the inecient employees are dismissed
Thus the same reasoning shows that
EE
PD

 n
m  n m  
m n
 
 Active employees dishonest rms Bad Equilibrium
In this case ecient employee employed in the rst period stay with the
rms if and only if the rm is good That is the expected number of
ecient employees who proceed the employment is n The expected
number of newly employed ecient employees in the second period is the
number of the vacancies multiplied by
e
 that could be calculated for this
case as
e
 
m  n
m n
 That is the total number of ecient employees
employed in the second period is
EE
AD

 n n n
e
  n n n
m  n
m n

that is
EE
AD

 n
m   m  n
m  n
 
It could be shown that the number of ecient employees employed is lower
in the latest case Thus we can conclude that the combination of active
employees and dishonest rms produce inecient outcome
One should interpret this observation in the following way The active
strategy of the employees play the role of enforcement tool in the model
It aims to stimulate rms to behave honestly that is in the way desirable
for the employees We have three di	erent cases In the rst case active
employees honest rms the enforcement mechanism works successfully
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That is the fear to loose an ecient worker produce incentives for a rm
to be honest In the second case passive employees dishonest rms the
mechanism is not used And in the latest case the mechanism is used
by the employees but fails to prevent deception We have seen that the
case when an enforcement tool is used without success produce inecient
outcome The reason why the enforcement mechanism is costless in the
rst case is obvious In fact this tool is never used or used only on case
of deviation the employees are ready to leave rms in case of deception
however the rms are honest and employees proceed their work On the
contrary in case of active workers dishonest rms Bad equilibrium
the employees are forced to use this tool producing high job turnover and
inecient outcome
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In section 
 we have analyzed the case of informal contracts with no
external enforcement device We examined internal personal enforcement
mechanism and found it could work but imperfectly For example it
always fails to prevent deception in the second period To go further we
introduce now formal contracts with external enforcement available We
introduce the third party namely the Court in the economy



The model to be analyzed in this section di	ers by the nature of contracts
concluded by the parties Now all the contracts are formal and written
but the enforcement mechanism does not work eciently It means that
deviations are possible but incur some costs Within the model the Court
procedure is introduced thus an employee could appeal to the Court in
case of employers deviation However deviations observed imperfectly by
the Court thus the enforcement power of legal procedure is to be analyzed
 Model description
The basic features of the model are nearly the same as for the case of
informal contracts
There are two populations in the market rms and employees The num
ber of rms is n the number of employees is m Any rm possesses one
working place The number of employees is greater then the number of

However we do not consider any social welfare maximizing problem for this
party and do not consider the punishments other then monetary Thus formally
the Court could be replaced by a private enforcer as well
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working places m  n The numbers m and n are large enough The pro
duction process is possible only in match of rm and employee Economy
exists for two periods
The objective function of a rm is the present value of its expected prots
E  Ef

g  Ef

g Here one period prot of a rm is calculated as

i
 x
i
 C
i
 where x
i
is one period output of a rm C
i
represents one
period costs The discount factor of any rm is 
The objective function of an employee is the present value of expected uti
lities EU  Efu

g 

Efu

g Here u
j
 um
j
 is the value of employees
utility function in period j where m
j
is the one period monetary income
of an employee 

is the discount factor of an employee
Firms and employees di	er in types
There are two types of employees ecient high productive and inecient
low productive The value produced by ecient employee during a period
is x
H
 the value produced by inecient employee in a period is x
L
 where
x
H
 x
L
 Thus the output of a rm is determined by the type of employee
and takes one of the two exogenous values The proportion of ecient
employees in the population is  We assume for the sake of simplicity
that the both types are present in the market     
We consider two types of rms in the market good and opportunistic
Proportion of good rms is  proportion of opportunists is     
We assume       The di	erences of rm types are similar to
those for the case of formal contracts and to be described formally below
The proportions    are common knowledge
The wages of an employee is determined by the contract A contract is
concluded for one period The parameters of the contracts are exogenous
and equal for all rms and employees
In this setting the interpretation of contract structure is somewhat di	e
rent
A rm and an employee conclude a contract that provides di	erent pay
ments for di	erent outputs If an employee turns out to be ecient the
output is x
H
 then his wage would be high w  w
H
 if an employee is
inecient output is x
L
 then his wage is low w  w
L
 The parameters
of the contract are exogenous Though this contract is written and for
mal it may occur nonbinding for a rm Although we introduce the legal
enforcement mechanism in the model this mechanism is supposed to be
imperfect We assume that the output of the rm is observable for the
contracting parties but may be veried by the Court only with some
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probability     

 Thus even if the legal procedure is initiated
by an employee the punishment for deviator is just stochastic and may or
may not prevent deception
A rm may deviate from the contract terms by insisting that the value of
output was low whereas the true high value is observable by both parties
but imperfectly veriable by the Court We suppose that good rm always
fullls contract terms opportunist maximizes his objective function by
choosing strategically whether to deceive an employee or not
We assume x
H
 w
H
 x
L
 w
L
 that is working honestly with ecient
employee is more protable then working with inecient
Let us now describe the timing in the model
When the game starts all the rms and all the employees are unmatched
At the beginning of the rst period uniform random matching occurs
The number m  n of employees stays unemployed We assume equal
probabilities for all the matches with no respect to types
In the rst period production takes place and the rms obtain revenues
Thus at the end of the period the type of an employee is observed by the
rm
At the end of the rst period the wages paid to employees At this time
opportunistic rms have to decide whether to fulll the nonobligatory rst
period contract
After the wage is paid an employee has an option to go to the Court and
contest his wage of course this option is valuable in case of low wage
only To make a decision an employee has to compare expected costs of
the legal procedure and expected benet of possible positive judgement
If he decides to go to the Court then legal procedure takes place For the
sake of simplicity we assume it to be momentary The legal procedure will
be described below
Now every match has to decide whether or not they would work together
for the second period The rm has an option to dismiss the employee
the employee has an option to leave rm If both parties prefer to work
together for the second period the match would survive
At the beginning of the second period some of rms and employees are
already matched and the rest of agents should go to the market and take
part in a new matching
	
The variable  may also include the probability for the Court decision to be
enforceable
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At the beginning of the second period new matching takes place Free
employees and free rms take part in this matching The matching is
random and uniform We assume the numbers n and m to be high enough
to exclude the probability for the same pair employee!employer to meet
in the both matchings
In the second period production takes place and revenues are obtained
Then at the end of the second period the wages are paid opportunists
have to decide whether to pay high or low wage to ecient workers
Employee has an option to initiate legal procedure at the end of the second
period
Let us now describe the legal procedure in the model
We assume the legal procedure to be momentary this assumption is made
to simplify the description time consuming procedures do not inuence
the spirit of the results


To make a sentence the Court has to verify the output of the rm We
assume that low output is perfectly veriable It means that there is no
reason for an inecient employee to appeal to the Court At the same time
high output of the rm could be veried with some probability    
Thus if an ecient employee goes to the Court there is a probability  that
the judgement is in favor of the employee and    is the probability of
judgement in favor of the rm The value of  supposed to be exogenous
The legal procedure is costly for an employee

 the value of costs is c
but in the case of winning he receives the compensation of wage w
H
w
L
and compensation of costs c from the rm Besides these transfers to the
employee if the rm lose the action it also have to pay some penalty s to the
Court We assume that c includes also the moral costs of the employee

that can be observed by the Court thus the utility level of an employee
if he wins is the same as if the rm fullling the contract


In subsection 
 we solve for the optimal strategies of the players sub
section  summarizes the equilibrium structure in  and  we study
comparative statics in the model  analizes the eciency issues


The Labor Code of RF 
 
paragraph  obliges an employer to pay an
interest to an employee in case of payment delay

According to the Labor Code an employee is exempted from ocial legal
expenses 
paragraph  however the lawyers	 fees persist as well as time con
sumption

Compensation of moral costs is provided by the Labor Code 
paragraph 

The assumption of the full costs compensation by the rm is made just to sim
plify the reasoning In fact one could suppose some proportion of the employee	s
costs to be compensated the spirit of the results would be the same However
the Court procedure less likely would be performed
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 Model solution
Within this setting the strategic variables to be determined are as follows
 The opportunists have to decide whether to pay high or low wage to
ecient employees in the rst period

 The ecient employees have to decide whether to go to the Court in
case of low wage in the rst period
 Firms have to decide whether to dismiss an employee at the end of the
rst period given the observed output
 Employees have to decide whether to leave the rms at the end of the
rst period given received wage
 The opportunists have to decide whether to pay high or low wage to
ecient employees in the second period
 The ecient employees have to decide whether to go to the Court in
case of low wage in the second period
First one can easily solve for the optimal dismiss strategy of the rm
Proposition  A rm of any type dismisses employee at the end of the
rst period if and only if employee in inecient
Proof Let us note that working with ecient employee is still preferable
for a rm then working with inecient In fact a rm of any type good
or opportunistic has an option to pay high wage to ecient employee in
the second period and exclude possible costs of legal procedure Since we
assume x
H
 w
H
 x
L
 w
L
matching with ecient employee is more
protable for a rm then matching with inecient in case of high wage
Since m  n there is some unemployment in the market and because of the
random nature of matching there are some ecient employees who stay
unemployed Thus if a rm observes the current employee being inecient
it is the best solution to dismiss this employee and to obtain some positive
probability to meet ecient one for the second period Controversially
there is some unemployment for inecient workers since if a rm dismisses
ecient employee it has some chance to meet inecient one 
 Appealing to the Court
As the next step let us solve for the optimal strategy of going to the Court
Let us note that the second period utility of an employee is not a	ected
by his decision to go to the Court in the rst period In fact a rm may
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prefer to promise dismissal for employee who goes to the Court but as
we have seen above never commit ex post to do it The second period
decision of an employee a	ects only second period utility as well
Proposition 	 Ecient employee goes to the Court in the both periods
if and only if the wage is low and
  

 
where


 

c 
u
L
 uw
L
 c
u
H
 uw
L
 c
 
Proof In case of high wage there is no reason to go to the Court In
case of low wage an employee has to compare his payo	s for alternative
strategies
 No legal procedure Employees utility is u
L


 Employee goes to the Court
a Firm wins probability   Employees utility is uw
L
 c
b Employee wins probability  Employees utility u
H

Thus in the case if employee initiates legal procedure the expected one
period payo	 is u   uw
L
 c  u
H

Employee initiate the legal procedure if
u
L
  uw
L
 c  u
H

This condition is equivalent to  
Thus an employee goes to the Court if the enforcement power charac
terized by probability of verication is high enough We should mention
that 

rises with the costs c of legal procedure That is high costs of the
procedure reduce the incentives to go to the Court
One can solve for the rms one period payo	s as well
 No legal procedure Firms prot is x
H
 w
L


 Employee goes to the Court
a Firm wins probability   Firms prot is x
H
w
L

b Employee wins probability  Firms prot x
H
w
H
 c  s
 INFORMAL CONTRACTS IN TRANSITION ECONOMIES
Thus in the case if employee initiates legal procedure the expected one
period payo	 of the rm is   x
H
  w
L
 w
H
 c s
Thus the payo	 of the rm in the case of ecient employee and low wage is

L
  x
H
C
L

where
C
L
 

w
L
   

c
w
L
 w
H
w
L
  c s   

c

The payo	 of an employee is
u
L
  maxfu
L
 uw
L
 c   u
H
g 


u
L
   

c
uw
L
 c   u
H
   

c

Now one can easily nd the optimal strategy for opportunist in the second
period
Proposition 
 Opportunistic rms fulll contract terms in the second
period if and only if
  maxf

 

g 

where 

is determined by  

is dened as


 

c s 
w
H
 w
L
w
H
w
L
  c s
 

Proof Opportunists fulll contract terms in the second period if and
only if
C
L
  w
H
 


where C
L
 is the expected costs of deception determined by  Its
easy to see that 
 is equivalent to 

 
We see that the Court procedure prevent deception of an employee by an
employer if employee goes to the Court and if the probability that he wins
is high enough One could see that 

falls with the rise of c and s that is
higher procedure costs to be paid and higher penalties produce incentives
for honest behavior
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The two questions that remain unsolved are decision of employee to stay
or to leave given the wage paid and decision of opportunist to pay high or
low wage to ecient worker in the rst period The decision of inecient
employee to stay or to leave is irrelevant for he is dismissed by a rm any
way Thus we should concentrate at ecient employees and opportunistic
rms
We introduce the notation the same as in the previous section
The strategy of the ith opportunistic rm is determined by probability
p
i
to fulll contract terms in the rst period With the probability  p
i
rm deceives an ecient employee and pays low wage
The strategy of the jth ecient employee is a pair of probabilities q
j

 q
j
H
 q
j
L
 In case of high wage in the rst period jth employee stays
with the rm with probability q
j
H
 in case of low wage he stays with
probability q
j
L

Denote by p 

n
P
i
p
i
an average value of p
i
in the population of
opportunists Average values of the probabilities to stay within the
population of ecient employees are q  q
H
 q
L
 q
H


m
P
j
q
j
H

q
L


m
P
j
q
j
L

 Employee
Consider the behavior of an ecient employee under the conditions of the
game Note that decisions are to be made by employees at the end of the
rst period thus only the second period component of payo	 function is
a	ected by this decision
We should consider separately the two cases a   maxf

 

g and
opportunists are honest in the second period and b   maxf

 

g
and opportunists deceive in the second period
a Let   maxf

 

g and all rms are honest in the second period
Then there is no reason for an employee to leave rm since employment
in any rm in the second period leads the same payo	 but leaving a rm
after the rst period may lead to unemployment
Proposition  If   maxf

 

g then ecient employees stay with
their rms
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b Let   maxf

 

g and opportunists deceive in the second period
Let us x the number of an employee under consideration say we consider
the behavior of the jth employee
Suppose the wage received in the rst period was high Then the expec
ted utility of the employee in the second period if he stays with the
rm is
U
H
S


 p
u
H

p
 p
u
L

If an employee leaves the rm the expected utility is
U
H
L
  	
j
e
j
u
H
 e
j
u
L
  	
j
u


where 	
j
is the probability for the jth employee to stay unemployed in
the secondperiod matching e
j
and e
j
 are the probabilities for an
employer to be good opportunistic given some employer was met by the
jth employee


The strategy to leave is chosen conditional on high wage if and only if
U
H
L
 U
H
S

Now suppose that the wage received in the rst period was low In this
case the expected utility in the second period is
U
L
S
 u
L

if the employee stays with the rm
If the employee leaves the rm the expected utility level is U
L
L
 U
H
L

The strategy to leave is chosen in case of low wage if and only if
U
L
L
 U
L
S

Lemma  Let   maxf

 

g Let q
j
H
e
j
 	
j
 q
j
L
e
j
 	
j

are the probabilities for jth ecient employee to stay with the rm
when he receives high low wage Then the optimal values of these

These probabilities are determined by the decisions to stay or to leave made
by other employees since the decision of the jth employee to leave is already
xed
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probabilities are
q
j
H
e
j
 	
j
 









  	
j
e
j


 p
 	
j
K


  	
j
e
j


 p
 	
j
K


q
j
h
  	
j
e
j


 p
 	
j
K




q
j
L
e
j
 	
j
 





  	
j
e
j
 	
j
K


  	
j
e
j
 	
j
K


q
j
l
  	
j
e
j
 	
j
K




where
K

 
u
L
  u

u
H
 u
L

 

	
j
is the probability for the jth employee to stay unemployed in the
secondperiod matching e
j
is the probability for an employer met in the
secondperiod matching to be good q
j
h
 q
j
l
are probabilities
As in previous section we can solve for equilibrium strategies of ecient
employees
Proposition  Let   maxf

 

g Let q
j
H
r q
j
L
r be the
probability of ecient employee to stay with rm when he receives high
low wage in the equilibrium and r is the unemployment rate Then
q
j
H
 
q
j
L
r 





 r  r


 r  r


q
j
l
 r  r




where r

 is a threshold value of unemployment rate calculated by
r

 

 K


 
 

q
l
is a probability
Proof is given in Appendix C
Note One can easily see that r

   
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One can see that the optimal strategy for an employee is either one of two
pure strategies or their mix
 Active strategy Employee stays in the rm if the wage is high and
leaves the rm if the wage is low q
H
  q
L


 Passive strategy Employee stays with the rm in any case q
H

 q
L
 
In the following analysis we omit for simplicity the zeroprobability case
r  r


 Firm
Now we should calculate the optimal strategy of opportunistic rm The
ith rm has to determine the probability p
i
to pay high wage to ecient
employee in the rst period
The wage paid in the rst period has some inuence to the probability
for the rm to be left by the employee at the end of the rst period
In this case the rm has to hire a new employee at the market The
probability
e
 to hire ecient employee in the second period is to be taken
into consideration The probability
e
 is endogenous it is determined by the
decisions of the opportunists to pay high or low wages and by subsequent
decisions of ecient employees to stay or to leave Let us dene
e

i
to
be the value of
e
 in the case if the ith rm decides to pay low wage to
ecient employee in the rst period and
e

i
to be the value of
e
 if the
ith rm pays high wages in the rst period
The ith rm has to compare the expected payo	s for the strategies to
fulll and not to fulll the nonobligatory contract terms

H
 x
H
w
H
 


q
H
x
H
C
L
q
H

e

i
x
H
C
L

e

i
x
L
C
L



L
 x
H
C
L
 


q
L
x
H
C
L
q
L

e

i
x
H
C
L

e

i
x
L
C
L



Suppose the employees play their equilibrium strategies that means that
q
H
  Then the payo	s of an opportunistic rm may be rewritten

H
 x
H
 w
H
  x
H
C
L


L
 x
H
C
L
 


q
L
x
H
C
L
q
L

e

i
x
H
C
L

e

i
x
L
C
L


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The rm fullls the contract if and only if 
H
 
L
or equivalently

e

i
x
H
 x
L
 q
L
  w
H
 C
L

We should state lemma that characterizes the behavior of the opportunist
Lemma  The optimal strategy of a rm could be determined as
p
i

e

i
 q 





 
e

i
 q
L
  K


 
e

i
 q
L
  K


p
i
 
e

i
 q
L
  K




where
K

 
w
H
C
L

x
H
 x
L
 

Corollary  If   maxf

 

g then all the opportunists fulll con
tract terms in the rst period
Proof In fact if   maxf

 

g then C
L
  w
H
and therefore all the
opportunists fulll contract terms Indeed in this case K

   while

e
 q
L
   Thus by  p
i

e

i
 q   
Important Digression
Let us suppose for a moment that the internal enforcement mechanism is una
vailable That is the contract structure 
or other external reasons prohibits an
employee to leave rm until the end of the second period In this case the only
mechanism available that may prevent deception is the Court procedure
Formally the absence of internal mechanism is equivalent to the fact that the
only strategy q
j
L
 q
j
H
  is available to the employees Thus q
L
 q
H
  In
this case one could see from 
 that the condition for a rm to be honest in
the rst period is
K

 
or equivalently
C
L

  w
H

As could be shown the last inequality is equivalent to
  max f

 

g
Thus we can state a proposition
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Proposition  Suppose the employees are obliged to stay with the rms they
had been matched with until the end of the game Than the rms are honest if
and only if
  max f

 

g
Note The last statement is independent of the availability of the Court proce
dure in the second period
In the following analysis we concentrate on the case   maxf

 

g
Let us omit for simplicity the case r  r

 when employees play mixed
strategies Then we should rewrite  for the other two cases
 r  r

 Then employees play passive strategy q
H
 q
L
  Then

 takes a form p
i

e

i
   for any
e

i
   Thus one can state a
proposition for equilibrium strategies of opportunists in this case
Proposition  Let   maxf

 

g Suppose the unemployment rate
exceeds the threshold value r

 given by 
 Then in equilibrium rms
never fulll the terms of informal contracts

 Now consider the case r  r

 In this case employees are active
they stay with rms if and only if the wage in the rst period was high
Formally q
H
  q
L
 
Proposition  Suppose   maxf

 

g r  r

 r

 is given
by 
 and employees play their equilibrium strategies Then the optimal
probability for ith opportunistic rm to fulll informal contract terms is
determined by the rule
p
i
p
i
 r 





 r  Rp
i
 
 r  Rp
i
 
p
i
 r  Rp
i
 

Here p
i
is the market average probability for an opportunist to fulll
informal contract terms given the ith rm deceives ecient employees
in the rst period Rp
i
  is the threshold value given by
Rp
i
   
  
K


 p
i

 
K

 is calculated by 
 p
i
is a probability
Proof is given in Appendix D
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Note Unlike the threshold r

 that distinguishes the strategic areas of
an employee and lies between  and  the function of Rp
i
  may take
values outside   interval If it happens some of the cases in  become
impossible
Note that Rp
i
  is increasing function of p
i
if and only if it takes
values lesser than  in fact the both properties are equivalent to inequality
K

   
In case K

     when the function Rp
i
  is increasing we
observe strategic complementarities between the opportunistic rms
higher values of p
i
that is higher probability to choose honest strategy
for the rms other then the ith lead to choose honest strategy by the ith
rm That is honest market provide incentives for a rm to be honest
Let us consider the symmetric case that is suppose all the opportunistic
rms play the same mixed strategy
Suppose an inequality holds K

     Then the threshold
Rp
i
  is greater then one and therefore  ultimately leads to p
i
 
That is opportunistic rms are honest in the rst period as soon as em
ployees are active
Now let us consider the case K

   
Find the condition for the equality p
i
 p
i
to be satised in  Consider
three cases
a Let p
i
  Then from  we have p
i
  if and only if
r  r


where
r

  
   
K





b Let p
i
  Then from  we have p
i
 if and only if
r  r


where
r

  
  
K



 
One can easily see that r

  r

 as soon as    and K

 
  
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c Suppose p
i
   Then to obtain p
i
 p
i
 p the equality
r  
  
K


  p
has to be satised One can solve the equation and nd
pr  
  
K


  r



 
It can be stated that pr     if and only if r  r

 r


Thus it can be stated that given K

    we obtain three zones
of unemployment rate
r  r

 then in a symmetric equilibrium opportunists are honest given
active employees
r

  r  r

 then the strategic complementarities between rms
produce multiple equilibria given active employees all the opportunist
may be honest or all may deceive or the intermediate mixed strategy
may be used by the rms
r  r

 then all the opportunists deceive even if the employees are
active
One should note that the intermediate equilibrium p  pr is unstable
In fact as soon as the market is moved from this point for example if
the parameters determining Rp  vary or if some miserable fraction of
the rms deviate

 the optimal choice of any rm is determined by pure
strategy For example if by some disturbance we obtain p  pr then the
optimal choice of any rm is p
i
  and switching to this strategy by some
rms would improve the incentives for switching for the others
As it was mentioned in the case K

     the rms are honest
However to unify the results one should introduce r

 and r

 dened
by 
  for this case as well Then we have   r

  r

 and
for any r we have r  r

 As well as in the case K

    this
inequality involves honest behavior
Let us summarize
Proposition  Let   maxf

 

g Suppose r  r

and the em
ployees play their equilibrium strategies Suppose the symmetric behavior
of the rms Then

Deviation here brings no loss for a rm since it is indierent between the
mixed strategies 
see 

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if r  r

 then the opportunists are honest Good equilibrium
if r

  r  r

 then multiple equilibria exist
a Good equilibrium all the opportunists are honest in the rst period
b Intermediate equilibrium opportunists choose mixed strategy with p 
 pr given by 
c Bad equilibrium all the opportunists deceive the ecient employees in
the rst period
if r  r

 then all the opportunists deceive in the rst period Bad
equilibrium
The intermediate equilibrium is instable
 Equilibria
Let us now summarize the results obtained and describe the equilibria in
the game
We shall concentrate at the case of symmetric equilibria that is the players
of given type choose the same mixed strategy
There are two di	erent cases of equilibrium structure in this model
First if the enforcement power is high enough   maxf

 

g then
the legal enforcement tool works The opportunistic rms are honest no
Court procedure initiated by the employees no need for the employees to
use the active strategy All the rms dismiss the employees in the end of
the rst period if and only if the employee is inecient
Second if the enforcement power is low   maxf

 

g then the
equilibrium structure is close to one we have observed in case of informal
contracts
All the rms dismiss the employees at the end of the rst period if and
only if the employee is inecient
Ecient employees choose whether to stay with a rm for the second
period or not according to the wage received in the rst period In the
equilibrium they choose one of the two strategies
A Active strategy  to stay with a rm if the wage is high and to leave
rm if the wage is low
P Passive strategy  to stay with the rm in any case
The opportunistic rms always deceive the employees in the second period
In the rst period opportunists deceive the employees if the employees are
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passive if the employees are active the optimal behavior of the oppor
tunists is determined by the unemployment rate
The choice of ecient employees and the rst period choice of opportunistic
rms whether to pay high wage to ecient employees are determined by
the value of unemployment rate and by the parameters of the model There
are three threshold values of unemployment rate r

 r

 and r


determined by 
 
 and  For the sake of generality we introduce
the values r

 r

 even in case K

   
Theorem  Consider symmetric equilibria in the game The equilib
rium strategies of the players are the following
a Let   maxf

 

g Then
 Opportunists are honest in the rst and in the second period

 Firms dismiss inecient employees after the rst period and do not
dismiss ecient
 Ecient employees stay with the rms they matched with
 No legal procedures initiated
b Let   maxf

 

g Then
 Opportunists deceive in the second period

 All the rms dismiss inecient employees at the end of the rst period
and never dismiss ecient employees
 In the both periods legal procedures initiated by ecient employees in
case of low wage if and only if   


 a For r  minfr

 r

g employees are active opportunists fulll
contract terms in the rst period
b For any r such that minfr

 r

g  r  minfr

 r

g three
equilibria of dierent structure exist in the game
i Good equilibrium employees are active rms fulll contract terms
ii Bad equilibrium employees are active opportunistic rms pay low
wages nevertheless
iii Intermediate equilibrium employees are active rms choose mixed
strategy with the probability to fulll contract terms in the rst period given
by 
c For minfr

 r

g  r  r

 employees are active but the oppor
tunists fail to fulll contract terms in the rst period
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d For r  r

 employees are passive and opportunists pay low wages
to them
Note As in case of informal contracts the intermediate equilibrium ap
pears to be instable
 Comparative statics I
In this section we shall repeat the analysis of the e	ects made to the
equilibria by parameters of the model that are not related with the legal
procedure
We should be interested in dependence of threshold values r

 r


r

 from market parameters
First consider the value of r

 that determine the switch of employees
from active to passive strategy Note that active strategy of employees
could de treated as a kind of market enforcement mechanism for rms to
fulll the contracts when employees are passive opportunistic rms break
the contracts Active strategy is applicable if unemployment rate is low
enough r  r

 We should examine the dependence of active zone from
market parameters
From 
 one could see that r

 increases with  and falls with  Thus
higher is the proportion of good rms at the market wider is the active
zone However the growth of proportion of competing ecient employees
narrows the active zone
Then r

 is a	ected by utility gaps between di	erent states for an
employee One should compare the utility increase when moving from
unemployment to low wage and from low wage to high wage If the gap
between high and low wages is wide enough it provides greater incentives
for active behavior Thus a fall of employees degree of risk aversion or a
rise of unemployment benets would increase employees activity
Now let us consider the parameters of opportunistic rms strategies
There are to threshold values of unemployment rate r

 r

 If un
employment is low r  r

 then rms fulll the contracts conditional
to activity of the employees If unemployment is high r  r

 then
rms break the contracts already in the rst period In the intermediate
zone the both cases are possible and the behavior of one rm is positively
related with the others What parameters determine the threshold values 
One can see from 
  that the both threshold values increase with
discount factor of rms  That is higher is valuation of future prots
wider is honest zone
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The threshold r

grows with the proportion of good rms Thus one
obtains strategic complementarities in rms behavior more honest rms
are at the market higher are the incentives for given rm to be honest
Within the zone of positive values of r

and r

the both thresholds de
crease with the proportion of ecient employees More ecient employees
are at the market less is the fear of a rm to lose an employee
Then higher relative productivity of ecient employees in comparison
with inecient produce incentives for honesty and vice versa higher rela
tive wages for ecient work are less likely to be paid
As well as in the case of informal contracts one should note that the mar
kets with higher proportion of good rms as well as more skilldemanding
markets should be less a	ected by deception phenomenon
 Comparative statics II
Let us now examine the e	ects made by the parameters of legal procedure
on the equilibria in the model
Remind that for low values of probability for an employee to win in the
Court   

 legal enforcement does not work employees nd it unpro
table to go to the Court
Suppose   

that is employees have enough incentives to go to the
Court in case of deception If moreover   

then the Court provides
punishment strong enough to prevent deception In the opposite case


   

the employees go to the Court in case of deception but the
Court fails to provide enough incentives for the rms to be honest
The condition   maxf

 

g guarantees the execution of the contract
by the rm with no respect to employees behavior For this range of
values of probability  the legal enforcement mechanism acts as contract
guarantee since the mechanism exists rms execute contract terms the
mechanism in fact is passive
Thus conditional on the order of values 

and 

one of the following
pictures take place
 

 

 Then
a   

 No enforcement case Employees do not go to the Court rms
are honest or dishonest according to market incentives
b   

 Passive enforcement case Firms fulll contract terms because
otherwise employee goes to the Court and expected punishment is greater
then the gain of contract breach
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 

 

 Then
a   

 No enforcement case
b 

   

 Active enforcement case Employees if deceived go
to the Court but the expected punishment is not high enough to prevent
contract breach of the rm Thus it is a common case that a rm breaks
the contract employee goes to the Court and possibly gets a compensation
c   

Passive enforcement case
The values of critical probabilities 

and 

are determined by the market
parameters and the parameters c and s of the legal procedure Note that
the probability  for an employee to win in the Court is formally exogenous
but in fact depends of unknown endogenous parameters such as specic
technology di	erent for di	erent industries degree of Court quality and
unbias and so on At the same time the parameters of legal procedure such
as procedure costs and especially the value of penalty may be determined
directly by the regulator
Let us consider the e	ects made by the procedure parameters on the critical
values of enforcement power 
Consider an employee The value 

that determines willingness of an
employee to go to the Court depends on the utility function of an employee
and rises with the costs of procedure That is costly legal procedure is less
likely to be realized
Now let us consider a rm An opportunistic rm is disposed to deceive an
employee if   

that is the expected value of punishment is low enough
in comparison with deception benets The value of the punishment is
determined by the probability  to catch the violator the costs c to be
paid and the penalty s We have seen that the rise of c and s would reduce
the threshold 

thus strengthening the incentives for honest behavior
given the legal procedure is initiated by the employee
To summarize the e	ects one should note that the rise of the penalty s
has an ultimately positive e	ect reducing deception whereas the rise of
the costs c has two opposite e	ects it deters the rms from deception
given the legal procedure was initiated but at the same time it deters the
workers from initiating legal procedures
Thus to optimize the procedure the regulator has to minimize the costs of
the procedure and to maximize the penalties required
The three cases of equilibria separated by these values are No Enforcement
Case Active Enforcement Case and Passive Enforcement Case
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 No Enforcement In this case no legal procedure initiated by emp
loyees The equilibrium strategies of the players are determined fully by
the parameters of internal enforcement Note that in this case the game is
perfectly equivalent to the case of informal contracts The threshold values
determining the type of equilibria are equal to those in case of informal
contracts r

  r

 r

  r

 r

  r

 All the properties
summarized for informal contracts hold for this case

 Passive Enforcement This is an ideal case All the rms maintain
contract terms with no respect to behavior of employees and parameters
of the market The Court is just a spectator who provides punishment in
case of deviations
 Active Enforcement This case occurs for medium values of Court
quality and occurs to be extremely inecient In fact the fear of legal
punishment does not prevent deception and a huge number of Court
examinations take place The costs of legal procedures paid by the parties
may be considered as a deadweight loss of the society
There is another reason to say that the active enforcement case is extremely
undesirable Note that the value r

 that determines the active zone of
the employees falls with the value of  within Active Enforcement Zone
That is the legal enforcement while do not prevent deception of employees
may moreover relax the internal market incentives for rms to be honest
One could say that when the two mechanisms coexist the imperfect legal
mechanism could force out the market one
The intuition of this substitution is the following An employee deceived
has two mechanisms to punish the rm First he may leave the rm with
some risk of being unemployed market tool Second he can appeal to
the Court and win the action with some positive probability legal tool
Either of this tools or the both may be used by the worker thus no substi
tution e	ects arise at this point However the opportunity to receive the
compensation by the Court procedure in the second period rises the utility
of being employed in dishonest rm in comparison with job search that is
of being passive Note that in Active zone the Court procedure seems
attractive to an employee that is expected benet is positive Thus
instead of leaving a rm which has shown to be dishonest an employee
may prefer to initiate legal procedures that bring some probability of com
pensation This is the way in which the presence of a legal system even
imperfect may reduce the incentives for an employee to use the market
enforcement mechanism
Consider an example Let the basic parameters of the model be the
same as in the Basic Example we considered in section 
 Suppose the
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productivity of ecient employees be x
H
 
 the productivity of inef
cient be x
L
  A contract promises one half of the product value to
be paid as the wage of an employee w
H
  w
L
 
 The utility
function of an employee is uw 
p
w The proportion of good rms is
   the rest of the rms are opportunists   
 The proportion of
ecient employees is    The discount factor of the rms is   
Remind that the threshold values calculated for the case of informal con
tracts were
r

 
 r

  r

 
The same numbers could be obtained in case of formal contracts with No
Enforcement For this values the employees are active in the rst period
and opportunists are honest if and only if r  
 for higher values of
unemployment rate the employees are passive and opportunists do deceive
them
Consider now the following parameters of the legal procedure the costs of
legal procedure are c   the penalty to be paid by the rm on case of
loss is s  
 the probability of verication of high output by the Court
is   
 Then we have
r


   r


  
 r


  

Let us calculate the parameters of legal enforcement quality


  

 


We see that   
 gives Active Enforcement case Suppose r  

Then in case of No Enforcement    for example the good equilibrium
obtained in the rst period by market forces
r

  
 r

   r

  
But if the probability to win in the Court rises to   
 we have bad
equilibrium for the same market parameters employees became passive
and opportunistic rms brake the terms of the contracts In fact they are
punished with probability   
 but the expected value of the punish
ment is not high enough to prevent deception The deadweight losses of
the legal procedure occur in this case Remind that if the employees had
no or less hope to win in the Court they would be ready to leave rms
in the rst period if deception happens and thus produce an incentive for
opportunists to be honest at least in the rst period
In fact we see that inecient legal mechanism had displaced the market
mechanism that could be ecient
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Once we have shown that the case of Active Enforcement is extremely
inecient the natural question emerges is there any way to exclude this
case in practice The answer is yes In fact the Active Enforcement case
occurs for some values of  if and only if 

 

 However we have an
easy way to reduce the value of 

by rising the value of the penalty paid
by the rms if deception is revealed by the Court
For given 

one could calculate the minimal value of penalty that excludes
Active Enforcement case
s



 c  w
H
w
L

 



 c 
By substitution of the expression for 

into  one gets
s

c  w
H
 w
L

u
H
 u
L
u
L
 uw
L
 c
 c 
There legal procedure with the parameters c s such that s  s

c will
be referred to as consistent procedure If the procedure is consistent the
only two cases are available for di	erent values of deception observability
For low values of  we have No Enforcement case where the market forces
work with no distortion from the legal system And for high probabilities
for the Court to observe deception we have Passive Enforcement case
where the legal procedure works as contract guarantee with no respect to
market parameters Note that though the value of s

c depends on the
employees utility function that may be not observed by the regulator the
only information needed to construct a consistent legal procedure is some
estimation for this function since we do not need to include an exact value
s

c in the set of procedure parameters
Given a procedure is consistent one could optimize the market outcome by
reducing the costs of legal procedure Note that low costs of the procedure
lead to reduce of the value 

that determines the boundary between the
No Enforcement and Passive Enforcement the latest case is of course more
desirable Remind however that the costs reduction MUST be accompa
nied by the appropriate rise of the penalty value
Consider an example
The parameters of the market proceed to be unchanged w
L
 
 w
H

  x
L
  x
H
 
 the utility function of employees is um 

p
m         
Suppose the legal procedure is determined by the parameters c   s 
 
 Then the critical values of  are


 
 

 
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Thus for   
 we have Passive Enforcement case For   
 No
Enforcement case occurs That is the type equilibrium is determined by
the unemployment rate For example for   
 we have
r

 
  
 r


   r


  
Thus for r  
 no deception occurs in the rst period
Suppose now that the procedure costs fallen from c   to c   Then
the new thresholds for Enforcement regime are


  

 

We see that for   
 the Active enforcement case take place For this
value one could calculate
r


   r


  
 r


  

That is the internal enforcement works just for r   For example if
r   
 we observe no deception if the costs of legal procedure are high
c   but deception occurs for low procedure costs c  
In fact to exclude this ineciency the regulator should rise the value of
penalty paid by the disturbers at least to s

  

 Note that
s

   We see that s  
 is high enough in this case to
exclude the case of Active Enforcement
	 Eciency
As well as in the case of informal contracts we should analyze the eciency
issues in the model
The aim of this section is just to identify the main sources of ineciency
not the exact calculation of the welfare for all the possible cases
There are three issues of eciency to be analyzed in this case eciency
in production eciency in distribution and eciency of Court procedure
 Distribution eciency
If the employees in the economy are riskaverse then the distribution pro
vided in case of deception may be inecient
In fact the welfare of a match before the legal procedure started if it is
started is calculated as
W    u  xw  uw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Note that the output of the match is determined exogenously by the type
of an employee x  x
H
for ecient employees and x  x
L
for inecient
and could not be a	ected by the wage paid However as soon as we assume
an employee being riskaverse the eciency of output distribution depends
on the values of the wages paid If we suppose the high wage to be ecient
u

w
H
   or at least to be closer to the optimal level then the low
wage is than we observe distribution ineciency produced by the fact of
deception

 Production eciency If the employees are risk neutral uw  w than
the fact of deception is irrelevant for the social welfare in the current period
the wages are paid ex post and a	ect the distribution only However the
practice of deception in the market could be a source of suboptimal level
of output in subsequent period
As well as in the case of informal contracts the source of production inef
ciency is the underemployment of ecient employees
The number of ecient employees employed in the rst period is exoge
nous whereas this number for the second period depends on the to stay or
to leave strategies chosen and could be calculated for the di	erent types
of equilibria
a Honest rms no need for activity Passive legal enforcement
active employees honest rms Good Equilibrium passive employees
dishonest rms
In all these tree cases all the ecient employees employed in the rst pe
riod stay with their rms while the working places occupied by inecient
workers in the rst period become vacant at the start of the second period
The number of ecient employees employed in the second period could be
calculated as see section 

EE
Good

 n
m n m 
m  n
 
b Active employees dishonest rms Bad Equilibrium
In this case ecient employee employed in the rst period stay with the
rms if and only if the rm is good
That is the total number of ecient employees employed in the second
period is
EE
Bad

 n
m   m  n
m  n
 
see section 

 CONCLUSION 
It could be shown that the number of ecient employees employed is lower
in the latest case Thus we can conclude that the combination of active
employees and dishonest rms produce inecient outcome
Note that the latest case represents the situation of Active regime for the
market enforcement tool when the employees use this tool leave dishonest
rms but the tool fails to prevent deception
 Court eciency As it was mentioned above actual use of the Court
procedure reduces the social welfare through the deadweight losses gene
rated by the costs of procedure These losses actually occur in case of
active enforcement that is in case when the legal enforcement tool is used
by the employees but fails to prevent deception In the other two cases
No enforcement and Passive enforcement cases there are no losses caused
by the legal procedure
However there are indirect e	ects on the eciency made by the Court
procedure namely the Court regime may a	ect the production eciency
through the change of equilibrium type For example switching from No
enforcement to Active enforcement regimemay have some positive e	ect on
the productivity if it leads the switch from activedishonest to passive
dishonest equilibrium However these e	ects are likely to be dominated
by the strict losses generated by inecient use of Court procedure
One could easily see the analogy between the eciency characterizations
of the two enforcement mechanisms under consideration In fact the both
mechanisms produce ineciency if and only if work in the Active regime
That is being used without preventing the undesired behavior
 CONCLUSION
In the paper a model of deception in labor market was constructed and
analyzed in two di	erent frameworks In Section 
 we considered the case
of informal contract between employee and employer when external en
forcement is impossible We examined the personal enforcement tool 
the possibility for ecient employees to leave rms in case of deception
Weve found that in a wide range of consequences this tool may prevent
rms from dishonest behavior and therefore play the same role as the trig
ger strategy in multiperiod prisoners dilemmamodels The dependence of
equilibrium structure from market parameters was analyzed in the paper
It was shown that a positive externality appears at the market greater
the proportion of good rms at the market less are the incentives to deceive
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an employee Another interesting feature is that higher is market sensi
tivity to the employees qualication lower are the incentives to deceive
That is deception is less likely to appear at skilldemanding markets
Nevertheless internal enforcement fails to prevent deception in a wide
range of consequences For example this tool never prevents deception in
the second period that is in the last period before rms closure Another
shortcoming of internal enforcement is that it works better for greater
proportions of inecient employees at the market If ecient workers
prevail in the population of the employees then this mechanism fails to
prevent deception
To go further we introduce in Section  a possibility of external enforce
ment of contracts in the model We should revise the formulation of labor
contracts for this reason Now we consider formal written contracts that
may be contested in the Court We have shown that in case of costly
andor imperfect legal procedure deception of employee by employer may
occur as well In fact if the costs of the procedure are high and the proba
bility to win is not so high then an employee prefers not to go to the Court
Even if the procedure is initiated by the worker the expected punishment
may occur low enough to keep incentives to deceive valuable
The three enforcement regimes may occur for the di	erent parameters of
the Court procedure If the probability to catch the violator is low enough
the No Enforcement regime prevails This case is perfectly equivalent to
the case of informal contracts since no legal procedures take initiated by the
employees If the probability for an employee to win in the Court is high
we observe Passive Enforcement regime In this case the existence of the
legal system guarantees the execution of contract terms If the parameters
of legal procedure fail to be consistent the medium and extremely ine
cient Active Enforcement case may arise In this case the legal procedure
fails to prevent deception and however weaken the internal enforcement
That is the existence of legal procedure weakens the incentives for ecient
employees to be active and therefore to prevent deception by internal tool
Thus the outcome may be even worse then in case of no legal enforcement
for the same parameters
To exclude the possibility of Active Enforcement regime the legal procedure
has to be consistent That is for given value of procedure costs the value
of penalty must be high enough Thus if a regulator aims to improve
the market eciency by the reduction of the costs of legal procedure this
reduction should be accompanied by penalty increase
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 Proof of Proposition 
Since the probabilities e
j
and 	
j
are endogenously determined in the
model one should calculate these probabilities in order to complete the
analysis of optimal strategy
Let the jth employee leave the rm at the end of the rst period Assume
all the strategies of all the other players be xed Then we can calculate
the average market values of p q
L
 q
H

p 

n
X
i
p
i

q
L
 q
j
L


m

X
k j
q
k
L
 
	

q
H
 q
j
H


m

X
k j
q
k
H
 
	

Let us introduce the notation
A
j
 A
j
p q
j
  the number of free vacancies in good rms at the
beginning of the second period
C
j
 C
j
p q
j
  the number of free vacancies in opportunistic rms
at the beginning of the second period
V
j
 V
j
p q
j
  A
j
 C
j
 the total number of free vacancies
all the values calculated given the jth employee leaves the rm
Then
A
j
 n q
j
H

C
j
 n

 pq
j
H
  pq
j
L




For example A
j
could be calculated as the number of good rms mul
tiplied by the proportion of employees who leave rms or dismissed The
proportion of good workers who stay in rms is q
j
H
the rest of employees
leave rms by one or another reason
The probability to meet good rm conditional on being employed could
be calculated as a fraction of the number of free good rms and the total
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number of free rms Then
e
j

A
j
V
j

The value of probability 	
j
to be unemployed could be calculated as a
fraction of excess labor and the number of free employees
	
j

m  n
V
j
m  n

By substitution of these equations into  
 one could get the formula
for optimal strategy of ecient employee
q
j
H
p q 












A
j
V
j
m  n


 p

m  n
V
j
m  n
K



A
j
V
j
m  n


 p

m  n
V
j
m  n
K


q
j
h

A
j
V
j
m  n


 p

m  n
V
j
m  n
K



q
j
L
p q 





 A
j
 m  nK


 A
j
 m  nK


q
j
l
 A
j
 m  nK



One can see from  and  that the optimal choice of an employee in
case of low wage is independent of the strategies chosen by rms
Now consider the case of high wage Let us show that q
j
H
p q   for any
p and q
j
 In fact
q
j
H
 
A
j
V
j
m  n


 p

m  n
V
j
m  n
K


 A
j


 p
V
j
m  n  m  nK


Let us show that A
j


 p
V
j
m  n Indeed
A
j


 p
V
j
m n
 n q
j
H
 

 p
m  n pq
j
H
   pq
j
L

  p  pq
j
H

m
n
  pq
j
H
   pq
j
L

  p    pq
j
L

m
n
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In the last inequality the lefthand side is less then one and the righthand
side is greater then one thus the statement is proven
Now the inequalities   can be rewritten in simpler form
q
j
H
p q   

q
j
L
p q 












n q
j
H

m  n
 K



n q
j
H

m  n
 K


q
j
l

n q
j
H

m  n
 K



Since the strategic decisions of rms to pay high or low wages have no
inuence at the optimal choice of employees we can derive the equilibrium
strategies of the employees right now
In the equilibrium the condition for an employee to leave rm takes a form
n 
m  n
 K


This condition can be rewritten in terms of the unemployment rate
r 
nm
m
 Then the condition takes a form
r  r


where
r



 K


 
 
B Proof of Proposition 
We should calculate the probability
e

i
to meet ecient employee at the
beginning of the second period given the ith rm pays low wage
Let the strategies of all the players be xed The decisions of opportunistic
rms except for the ith could be summarized in the value
p
i


n

X
li
p
l
 
	

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that is an average probability for an opportunist to be honest in the rst
period given the ith rm is dishonest
Denote by L
i
 Lp
i
 q the number of free ecient employees at the
beginning of the second period given the ith rm pays low wage in the
rst period
Then L
i
may be calculated as a number of all ecient employees except
for those who have stayed with the rms
L
i
 

m  n p
i
    p
i
q
L



Denote by V
i
the total number of free vacancies in the market in the
beginning of the second period given the ith rm deceives in the rst
period As before V
i
could be calculated as
V
i
 A
i
C
i

where
A
i
 n q
H

C
j
 n  p
i
q
H
  p
i
q
L


The probability to meet ecient employee is a fraction of the number of
free ecient employees and the total number of free employees
e

i

L
i
V m  n

Then
e

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
m  n p
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L
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L
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e
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
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By substitution one gets
p
i
p
i
 q 












  q
L

m  
m  n q
L
  q
L
p
i

 K


  q
L

m  
m  n q
L
  q
L
p
i

 K


p
i
  q
L

m  
m  n q
L
  q
L
p
i

 K



APPENDIX 
Now rewrite the condition 
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Rearranging this equation in terms of r 
m  n
m
we obtain the statement
of the proposition
C Proof of Proposition 
Since the probabilities e
j
and 	
j
are endogenously determined in the
model one should calculate these probabilities in order to complete the
analysis of optimal strategy
Let the jth employee leave the rm at the end of the rst period Assume
all the strategies of all the other players be xed Then we can calculate
the average market values of p q
L
 q
H

p 

n
X
i
p
i

q
L
 q
j
L


m

X
k j
q
k
L
 
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q
H
 q
j
H


m

X
k j
q
k
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Let us introduce the notation
A
j
 A
j
p q
j
  the number of free vacancies in good rms at the
beginning of the second period
C
j
 C
j
p q
j
  the number of free vacancies in opportunistic rms
at the beginning of the second period
V
j
 V
j
p q
j
  A
j
 C
j
 the total number of free vacancies
all the values calculated given the jth employee leaves the rm
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Then
A
j
 n q
j
H

C
j
 n

 pq
j
H
  pq
j
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



For example A
j
could be calculated as the number of good rms mul
tiplied by the proportion of employees who leave rms or dismissed The
proportion of good workers who stay in rms is q
j
H
the rest of employees
leave rms by one or another reason
The probability to meet good rm conditional on being employed could
be calculated as a fraction of the number of free good rms and the total
number of free rms Then
e
j

A
j
V
j

The value of probability 	
j
to be unemployed could be calculated as a
fraction of excess labor and the number of free employees
	
j

m  n
V
j
m  n

By substitution of these equations into 
 
 one could get the formula
for optimal strategy of ecient employee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One can see from  and  that the optimal choice of an employee in
case of low wage is independent of the strategies chosen by rms
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Now consider the case of high wage Let us show that q
j
H
p q   for any
p and q In fact
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In the last inequality the lefthand side is less then one and the righthand
side is greater or equal then one thus the statement is proven
Now the inequalities   can be rewritten in simpler form
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Since the strategic decisions of rms to pay high or low wages have no
inuence at the optimal choice of employees we can derive the equilibrium
strategies of the employees right now
In the equilibrium the condition for an employee to leave rm takes a form
n 
m  n
 K

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This condition can be rewritten in terms of the unemployment rate
r 
nm
m
 Then the condition takes a form
r  r
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D Proof of Proposition 
We should calculate the probability
e

i
to meet ecient employee at the
beginning of the second period given the ith rm pays low wage
Let the strategies of all the players be xed The decisions of opportunistic
rms except for the ith could be summarized in the value
p
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that is an average probability for an opportunist to be honest in the rst
period given the ith rm is dishonest
Denote by L
i
 Lp
i
 q the number of free ecient employees at the
beginning of the second period given the ith rm pays low wage in the
rst period
Then L
i
may be calculated as a number of all ecient employees except
for those who have stayed with the rms
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Denote by V
i
the total number of free vacancies in the market in the
beginning of the second period given the ith rm deceives in the rst
period As before V
i
could be calculated as
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The probability to meet ecient employee is a fraction of the number of
free ecient employees and the total number of free employees
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Now rewrite the condition 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Rewriting this equation in terms of r 
m  n
m
we obtain the statement
of the proposition
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